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Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*

The federal securities laws do not contain a definition of insider trading. As a result,
case law has developed in a common law fashion from the broad statutory antifraud
prohibitions. The result has been a tortuous path in defining the reach of the
prohibition against trading securities on the basis of nonpublic information. This
Article examines outsider trading, which occurs when market participantswho are not
corporate insiders obtain material nonpublic information. The Article explores the
distinction between outsiders who may not and those who may enter into securities
transactions on the basis of that information. SEC rulemaking has adopted a relatively
broad reading of the law's reach to deal with outsider trading. In contrast, the trend in
recent cases has been to question that breadth. This Article examines recent
developments and concludes that the SEC got it right. Namely, trading prohibitions
properly extend "outsider trading" to certain individuals even if they are not under a
fiduciary duty to keep the information confidential. The Article also explores the range
of outsiders who should be covered by tradingprohibitions.A final recommendation is
that the confusion in the cases demonstrates that Congress should recognize the need
for a statutory definition of both insider and outsider trading.

* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill; B.A., 1969, Columbia University; J.D., 1972, Columbia Law School. Portions of this Article have
been adapted from some of my earlier writings, including 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 12.17 (6th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2009). I would like to thank Professor
William K. Wang for his helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal securities regulation is designed to promote full disclosure
to investors.' In other words, the securities laws are based on the premise
that sunlight is the best disinfectant? Full disclosure means the markets
are fully informed to the extent practicable and that securities prices
reflect the mix of publicly available information? With full disclosure as

i. See, e.g., Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340 1340 (1966)
(discussing the history and purpose of the first federal securities laws). See generally FERDINAND
PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939) (discussing the events leading up to enactment of federal
securities laws); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of '933, 43 YALE
L.J. 171 ('933) (detailing the background of the first federal securities law); James M. Landis, The
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959) (discussing the
history of the Securities Act of 1933); Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann. Introductory
Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 329 (1988) (outlining some of the history behind the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
2. This is the oft-cited phrase of Louis D. Brandeis. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman."); see also I THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIEs REGULATION § 1.2(3) (6th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2009).

3. The impact of disclosure on market price is captured by the efficient capital market
hypothesis, which focuses on "how successful the market is in establishing security prices that reflect

the 'worth' of the securities, success being defined in terms of whether the market incorporates all new
information in its security prices in a rapid and unbiased manner." SIMON M. KEANE, STOCK MARKET
EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 9 (1983); see, e.g., JACK C. FRANCIS, INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 644-86 (1980) (discussing the efficient capital market hypothesis); JAMES
H. LORIE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 56, 56-6 (2d ed. 1985) (same); Eugene

F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and EmpiricalWork, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970)
(reviewing the basis for the efficient capital market hypothesis); see also, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A
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the basic premise of the federal securities laws, a corollary has developed
that investors should have equal access to information.4 Trading
securities on the basis of material nonpublic information gives a trader
an unfair advantage over other investors that runs counter to the premise
of federal securities law.5 Insider trading deprives investors of the level
playing field that should exist in the securities markets. There are, of
course, informational advantages that are legitimate. For example, if
professional investors obtain superior knowledge or understanding
through research or other efforts derived from publicly available
information, then they can legitimately take advantage of their own
6
efforts. It is quite another thing, however, when the informational
advantage is based upon information that is not publicly available. The
securities-laws trading prohibitions focus on the latter situation.
The absence of a clear definition of insider trading under federal
securities law has led to hundreds of decisions grappling with the issue.7
Many of these decisions are confusing and inconsistent with one
another.8 The purpose of this Article is not to add to the voluminous
literature9 on insider trading. 0 Instead, this Article tackles one important

(9th ed. 2007) (suggesting portfolio diversification as a
method of accounting efficiency in the capital markets); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock
Market Prices, 39 J. Bus. 34 (1965) (analyzing market efficiency).
4. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24599, 65 Fed. Reg.
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 188-96

51716-o (Aug. 15, 2000) (discussing the SEC's rationale for the need for equal access).
5. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 4o F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968) (relying on 3
Louis Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1455-56 (2d ed. 1961)); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,

912 (1961), quoted infra note 168; Remarks of William L. Cary, in Symposium, Insider Trading in
Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. Io9, ioo (1966). Among other things, a level playing field is important to give
investors confidence in the securities markets.

6. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (discussing the importance of allowing
investment advisors and investment analysts to profit from information obtained legitimately).
7. For a detailed discussion, see 4 HAZEN, supra note 2, § 12.17.
8. Compare United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (stockbroker
did not violate Rule iob-5 when trading on information obtained from customer), with SEC v. Willis,
825 F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Rule iob-5 violation by broker of psychiatrist who
misappropriated information from patient).
9. See, e.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PREVENTION (2009) [hereinafter LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION] (treatise devoted to
insider trading); HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing in
defense of permitting insider trading); WILLIAM H. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING

348-68 (1968) (treatise devoted to insider trading); WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER
TRADING (2d ed. 2oo8) (same); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider
Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA.

L. REv. 1425 (1967)

(defending strong insider trading

regulation); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L.
REv. 375, 382 (1999) ("[I]nsider trading law protects the autonomy of public securities traders from
unfair and wrongful deception."): see also Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition:A
Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35 (1986) (arguing against prohibiting insider
trading); William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863
(1987) (questioning the wisdom of devoting scarce resources to the prevention of insider trading);
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unresolved issue: Identifying the circumstances under which persons who
are not traditional corporate insiders will be held accountable for what
has become known as "outsider trading.""
Though trading by outsiders can take a handful of forms, this
Article focuses on two such forms and uses the term "outsider trading"
to refer to them. In particular, this Article addresses outsider trading that
occurs either (i)when an investor acquires information from a company
or from someone else with the expectation that the information will be
kept confidential; or (2) when outsiders obtain the information through
certain types of wrongful conduct, including theft. The theme uniting
these forms of outsider trading is the wrongfulness of the outsider's
conduct with respect to the person or company that is the source of the
information. Though information can also get into the hands of outsiders
when it is wrongfully passed on to them by insiders in breach of their
fiduciary duties, this Article does not consider the extent to which
trading prohibitions apply to such "tipper/tippee" situations, as the
relevant law covering those situations is essentially settled." Instead, this
James D. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 353 (1988)
(supporting insider trading regulation as a matter of fairness and equal access to information); David
D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 8o Nw. U. L. REv. 1449
(1986) (opposing insider trading prohibitions); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on
the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation,8o MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1071 (1982) ("The Internal

Efficiency rational suggests that allowing insider trading would have adverse effects of a pervasive and
systemic nature upon internal decision-making and efficiency."); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider
Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Insider Trading] (urging a broad application of the misappropriation theory);
Thomas H. Noe, Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency,

13

J.L. EcoN.

& ORG.

287

(1997) (economic analysis of insider trading).
io. Also not considered is state law of insider trading, which, although it has been applied
relatively rarely, still has some vitality. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading:
Reawakening the Common Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 845,845-60 (1982).
ii. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MiCH. L. REV. 313,
358-4o8 (2oo2) (urging a laissez faire approach to outsider trading); Robert A. Prentice. The Impact of
Dirks on Outsider Trading, 13 SEc. REG. L.J. 38 (1985) (analyzing the law of outsider trading): Jeffrey
P. Strickler, Note, Inside Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recovery of the Outsider's
Unfair Gain, 73 CAL. L. REV. 483, 523 (1985) ("Outsider trading activity is detrimental to the integrity

of the national securities markets.").
12. The law is quite clear that tipper and tippee liability will exist when someone who is under a
duty not to trade (the "tipper") passes on the information to someone else (the "tippee") in order to
enable the tippee to take advantage of the information that the tipper could not. See Dirks v. SEC. 463
U.S. 646, 659-61 (1983) (holding that an investment adviser was not subject to liability since
information was not passed on for the purpose of trading); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024,
1036 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming conviction of newspaper reporter who passed on material information
about upcoming columns; the reporter as a nontrading tipper and his tippees who traded were
convicted for having violated Rule iob-5), affd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987);
see also United States v. Falcone,

257

F.3d

226,

234-35 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that knowledge of

tipper's breach of duty supported tippee's conviction); United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133. 13839 (ad Cir. 2oox) (liability based on tip of information between paramours); United States v. Ruggiero,
56 F.3d 647, 649 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction of tippee of corporate insider): SEC v. Palermo,
No. 99CIV 1oo67, 2001 WL ii6o6i2, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. a, 20ol) (holding that questions of fact
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Article explores recent cases applying federal trading prohibitions to the
two forms of outsider trading identified above, and seeks to provide a
measure of clarity in this unsettled area of law.
Instances of outsider trading have received publicity and notoriety
over the years. For example, Martha Stewart's legal problems stemmed
from an insider trading investigation." Defendants in outsider trading
cases have included a wide range of people, including psychiatrists,
football coaches, 5 former athletes," other high profile sports figures,' 7
adult film stars,'" newspaper columnists,' 9 printers,20 leading
arbitrageurs, 2 ' golfing partners,22 and lawyers. 3

precluded summary judgment in suit claiming tippee violated Rule iob-5); SEC v. Cassano, 61 F.
Supp. 2d 31, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (sufficient allegations that tippee acted with scienter); SEC v. Falbo,
14 F. Supp. 2d 5o8, 5 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (tipper held to have violated Rule 14e-3); SEC. v. Sekhri,
No. 98 Civ. 2320, 1998 WL 259932, at *2.-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1998) (finding allegations against remote
tippee who received repeated phone calls from original tippee's friend sufficient to overcome a motion
to dismiss); SEC v. Seibald, No. 95 Civ. 2081, 1997 WL 605114, at *1-2, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1997)
(finding triable issues of fact and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in case where
SEC alleged that friends and relatives of a securities analyst bought stock based on an illegal tip from
the analyst sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss); SEC v. Ferrero, No. IP 92 271 C., 1992 WL
2o8015, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. July 22, 1992) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in case
where SEC alleged that tippee knew or should have known that corporate insider breached a fiduciary
duty by passing on nonpublic information); SEC v. Ferrero, No. IP 91 271 C., 1993 WL 625964 (S.D.
Ind. Nov. 15, 1993) (finding for plaintiff SEC after bench trial); cf In re AST Research Sec. Litig., 887
F. Supp. 231, 235 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (failure to state cause of action for tipper liability); SEC v. Mayhew,
916 F. Supp. 123, 130 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding there was no Rule lob-5 violation because source of
information did not breach fiduciary duty), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir.
1997).

13. Ms. Stewart was prosecuted for obstruction of justice and lying to investigators in connection
with an insider trading investigation. See Scott Turow, Cry No Tears for Martha Stewart, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2004, at A29. The investigation involved sales of a pharmaceutical company's stock by
members of the CEO's family in advance of bad news from the FDA about a company product. Id.
Ms. Stewart also sold shares in advance of public disclosure of the unannounced bad news. Id. Insider
trading charges would have been very difficult to establish in her case. See United States v. Stewart,
305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (judgment of acquittal on securities fraud charge); see also,
e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of Rule rob-5 for
Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L. REv. 380 (2oo6) (discussing the Martha
Stewart case).
14. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (psychiatrist who breached

doctor/patient confidentiality).
15. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 757-59, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that a football
coach who acted on information he overheard did not violate Rule iob-5).
16. See SEC v. Tarkenton, Accounting & Auditing Information Act Release No. AE-12, 71 SEC
Docket 1219 (Jan. 24, 2000) (charges against former professional football player).
17. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (N.D. TeX. 2009) (owner of professional
basketball team charged with outsider trading).
18. United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2oo) (adult film star involved in
insider-trading Rule rob-5 violations).
19. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming conviction of
author of Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column for insider trading by passing on
information from forthcoming columns), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987).
20. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-35 (1980) (overturning conviction of financial
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At one time, the cases interpreting federal law took a broad view of
who is covered by outsider trading prohibitions. Basically, anyone in
possession of material nonpublic information, whether outsider or
insider, was thought to be barred from using that information to trade
securities. 2 4 However, the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States25
subsequently held that such a broad definition of prohibited trading was
not supported by the applicable statute, Securities Exchange Act section
lo(b)." Instead, the Court ruled that liability must be premised on fraud,
deception, breach of duty, or possibly other wrongful conduct?' Thus,
post-Chiarella, trading while in mere possession of material nonpublic
information would no longer be sufficient to trigger liability. Although
Chiarella thereby limited the scope of outsider (and insider) trading
liability under section 'o(b), outsider trading prohibitions nevertheless
remained viable under "appropriate circumstances." 8 However, in the
absence of specific guidance from the Court, the "appropriate
circumstances" giving rise to outsider trading liability remained unclear.
As a consequence, confusing and often inconsistent case law followed in
the circuit and district courts. 9
In response, the SEC adopted Rule Iob5-2 3 o in an attempt to
provide more certainty in identifying relationships and situations when
printer trading on information obtained from documents being printed); SEC v. Materia. 745 F.2d 197,
199 (2d Cir. 1984) (proofreader for financial printer trading on nonpublic information from

documents).
21. See In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 36 F-3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1994) (insider trading violations
by prominent risk arbitrageur).
22. See SEC v. King, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1140, 1140 (W.D. Va. 200o)
(nonpublic

information passed on during golf game).
23. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (upholding conviction of lawyer who

traded on information obtained from one of his firm's clients); cf Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider
Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. 19 J. CORP. L. I (1993) (analyzing the

Restatement and suggesting that insider trading by lawyers ought to be proscribed as a matter of law
and as a matter of professional ethics). Liability for insider trading has also extended to other law firm
employees. See, e.g., United States v. Larrabee, 240 F.3d 18, 19-22 (Ist Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction
of law firm employee, on circumstantial evidence, for tipping nonpublic information about pending
merger involving firm's client). For a discussion of information barriers, see 4 HAZEN, supra note 2.
§ 14-12.
24. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 4o F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The essence of the
Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation has 'access,

directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone' may not take 'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing,' i.e., the investing public." (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907,

912 (1961)));

4 HAZEN, supra note 2.

25. 445 U.S. 222, 233-35 (1980).

26. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo8).
27. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-36.
28. Id.;
accord O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 662; see infra notes 45 49 and accompanying text.

29. See supra note 8.
30. 17 C.F.R. §240. iob5-2 (2009); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7881, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-
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outsiders could be placed under trading prohibitions. The SEC in Rule
Iob5-2 took a broad, and justifiable, view of the law's reach with respect
to corporate outsiders. 3' Yet the trend in recent cases has been to
question the validity of the SEC's view of outsider trading liability.32
The timing of this Article is triggered by two recent decisions
focusing on the scope of outsider liability for trading on material
nonpublic information.33 Both decisions represent partial victories for the
SEC in its relatively broad view of outsider trading. However, the cases
also take too narrow a view of the reach of section io(b) and Rule 'ob-5.
This Article concludes that the SEC in Rule Job5-2 takes a proper view
and that many of the recent cases take an overly restrictive view of what
the statute permits. The Article also suggests that a statutory definition
of prohibited insider and outsider trading is long overdue.
The Parts that follow begin with an overview of the development of
insider trading law under Rule Iob-5. This is followed by a discussion of
SEC Rule 'ob5-2 that attempts to give certainty in defining the scope of
outsider trading. Next, the Article analyzes the most recent cases and
points out where they went wrong and what they got right. The
discussion then goes beyond existing law and concludes with a
recommendation for a legislative solution.
. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BASIS OF INSIDER TRADING LIABILITY
UNDER RULE Iob-53 4

The federal securities laws' primary weapon against insider trading
is the general antifraud Rule iob-5.35 Rule iob-5 was adopted in 1942

24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716-o (Aug. 15, 2ooo); see infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.iob5-2 (setting forth situations and relationships that trigger the duty not to

trade on undisclosed material nonpublic information).
32.

See SEC v. Yun, 327 F-3d 1263, 1273-74 (iith Cir. 2003) (affirming lower court's

determination whether communications between spouses were confidential was a jury question, where
jury found that postnuptial negotiations created confidential relationship so as to support insider
trading liability based on a tip of information between husband and wife, but vacating for new trial on
other grounds); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that
interspousal communication did not trigger Rule iob-5 liability for insider trading); SEC v. Cuban, 634
F. Supp. 2d. 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that a confidentiality agreement did not support
Rule iob-5 violation where defendant traded on the basis of nonpublic information); United States v.
Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d ioo6, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding mutual expectation of confidentiality did
not support Rule iob-5 violation); see also Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise
of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1353-57 (2009) (claiming, among other things, that the
current SEC view goes beyond what is permitted by controlling Supreme Court precedent).
33. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d. at 730-31 (holding that confidentiality agreement did not support
liability for insider trading); SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49-51 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that hacker
could be liable if theft was procured through a misrepresentation).
34. For more detailed discussion of the basis of insider trading liability, see supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
35. 17 C.F.R. §24o.Iob-5. Rule lob-5, which has not been amended since its adoption in 1942,
states:
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under the rulemaking authority granted to the SEC by section io(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule was enacted without
significant deliberation" and does not even mention insider trading.' 8 As

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.

36. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2oo6 & Supp. 2008) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.").
37. According to the account provided by Milton Freeman:
It was one day in the year 1943, 1 believe [in fact, it was 1942]. I was sitting in my office
in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then
the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston,
"and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston who is going around
buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at $4.oo a share, and he has
been telling them that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are
going to be quadrupled and will be $2.oo a share for this coming year. Is there anything we
can do about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section
xo(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had
there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it
should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember whether
we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to all the
commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said, "Well," he said,
"we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it happened.
Milton V. Freeman, Remarks at the American Bar Association Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, in 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). This account was quoted by Justice
Blackmun in his dissent in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. By contrast, section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act does address trading by certain
corporate insiders. See 15 U.S.C. §78p. However, that section is not addressed to insider trading as
that term is generally understood by the public. Section 16(a) requires officers, directors, and ten
percent beneficial owners of a public company's stock to report all of their transactions in shares. Id.
§ 78(p)(a). Section s6(b) requires disgorgement of short-swing profits (within a six-month period) by
those statutory insiders, regardless of whether they relied on material nonpublic inside information in
making those trades. Id. §78p(b). Section s6 is a prophylactic remedy designed to prevent certain
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a general antifraud rule, it prohibits more trading-related wrongdoing
than just insider trading. For example, it creates liability for
misrepresentations to the investing public.39 Experience has shown,
however, that we would be better served by a clear statutory definition of
insider trading, setting forth specific limits on trading while in possession
of material nonpublic information. Although Congress came close to a
definition in 1984,40 there has been no significant attempt since. Without
a statutory definition on the horizon, the courts will continue to muddle
through the tortuous path of Rule Job-5 liability for insider trading.
Rule iob-5 is generally acknowledged as designed to prevent fraud
and deception in connection with securities trades. 4' However, the evils
of insider trading go beyond fraud. Insider trading gives an unfair
advantage to some market participants and can shake investor
confidence in the securities markets. 4 2 Therefore, dealing with insider
trading through an antifraud rule is like trying to fit a square peg into a
round hole. But since this problem has not been addressed through a
statutory solution, the courts have little choice other than to struggle with
Rule 'ob-5 and its parent, section io(b).
Though federal securities law is statutory in nature (and thus
technically speaking has not been derived by courts as a matter of
common law), the law of insider trading has an essentially common-law
character. This is because the law is not spelled out with particularity in
the statute or SEC rules, but rather is found in the case law. Accordingly,
speculative transactions by designated statutory insiders and, unlike Rule iob-5, does not address
insiders or outsiders who trade while using material nonpublic information. For discussion of section
16, see 4 HAZEN, supra note 2, § 13, and 5 id.
39. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-36, 242-50 (1988) (discussing liability for

materially misleading statements and approving of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance).
40. See H.R. 559, 98th Cong. (1983). Although the House version of the bill, which was ultimately
adopted, does not define insider trading, there was some movement in the Senate to provide a
definition. See generally David M. Brodsky, Insider Trading and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984: New Wine into New Bottles?, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 921 (1984) (discussing the history of the
1984 Act); Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and Its
Effect on Existing Law, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1273 (1984) (analyzing the Act as a reaffirmation of existing
law); Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider Trading

Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960 (criticizing the penalty provisions); Tammy L. O'Leary &
Timothy F. O'Leary, Comment, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: Did Congress and the SEC
Go Home Too Early?, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497 (1986); S.B., Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REv- 455 (1985).
41. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 -31, 213-14 (1976) (stating that the

deception requirement means that the defendant must have acted with scienter); see also, e.g., Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977) (holding that since section io(b) is limited to
deceptive conduct, it cannot be used to combat "instances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in
which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary"); cf
Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (holding that section 14(e) of the 1934 Act is
limited to deceptive conduct).
42. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 4ol F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (relying on 3 Loss, supra note
5, at 1455-56; Cary, supra note 5, at 1olo); see infra notes '48-49.
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insider and outsider trading law has developed through courts adapting
insider trading prohibitions to section io(b)'s and Rule iob-5's broadly
worded fraud and deception limitations, much in the same manner as
common law evolves-i.e., on a case-by-case basis. This has led to an
imperfect and uneven federal law of insider and outsider trading. For
example, a stockbroker trading on nonpublic information that had been
supplied by his customer was exonerated43 on facts very similar to those
sufficient to hold a psychiatrist liable for trading on information supplied
by a patient."
Trading on inside information can occur in various contexts. First,
there is what is often referred to as "classical" insider trading, which
consists of those instances in which a true company insider, such as an
officer or director, trades on nonpublic information she acquired as a
result of her special and fiduciary position with the company.4 5 Second,
there are cases where an insider passes on this information to someone
else-referred to as "tipper/tippee" liability.#6 Finally, as noted above,
there are those instances often referred to as "outsider" trading,4 7 where
someone who does not have a special relationship to the company
acquires information about the company and improperly trades on that
information; these are most often referred to as the "misappropriation"

cases.48
The law prohibiting classical insider trading by company insiders is
relatively straightforward. A company insider who is in possession of
material nonpublic information about her company is subject to what is
43. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that stock broker
who traded on nonpublic information provided by customer did not violate Rule lob-5); see Thomas
Lee Hazen, United States v. Chestman- Trading in Securities on the Basis of Nonpublic Information
in Advance of a Tender Offer, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 595 (1991) (discussing the Chestman decision). There

was evidence that when the customer called his broker to trade on the inside information, the broker
told the customer that that would be illegal but the broker nevertheless went ahead and traded on the
information. Id. at 604.
44. SEC v. Willis, 825 F. Supp. 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (misappropriation by broker of psychiatrist,
who had misappropriated information from patient). The court relied on the confidentiality imposed
by the doctor-patient relationship. See id. at 622. It seems anomalous to interpret the securities laws to
give more weight to the doctor-patient relationship than to a stockbroker-customer relationship.
especially since stockbrokers are heavily regulated by the Securities Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§780 (2oo6) (broker-dealer registration requirements and prohibited practices). In contrast to
Chestman, the patient in Willis did not pass on the information for the purpose of trading. See Willis,
825 F. Supp. at 618-23. This is probably not a significant distinction since in the Chestman case, there
was evidence that the broker advised the customer that the customer could not trade because of
insider trading prohibitions, and thus the broker was not trading with the customer's permission.
45. See, e.g., Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 833 (involving not only classical insider trading by
true insiders but also trading by persons who had been tipped with the nonpublic information).
46. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1983) (discussing the scope of tipper/tippee
liability); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note I I.
48. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (i997) (holding lawyer liable for trading on
information he misappropriated from his law firm).
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generally described as the "disclose or abstain" rule.49 Although the
disclose or abstain rule is phrased in the alternative, rarely, if ever, is
disclosure a viable alternative. 0 Accordingly, the rule boils down to a
duty to abstain from trading until the company or other rightful owner of
the information makes a decision to disclose it and the information has
been digested by the market."
The disclose or abstain rule was derived from subsection (c) of Rule
'ob-5, which prohibits conduct "which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit." 2 As noted above, Rule rob-5 liability is premised on
misuse of information that is not available to the general investing
public." If trading by the insider takes place prior to the filtration of
information into the securities markets, other market participants who
rely on the integrity of the markets and the federal disclosure
requirements have been deceived. In other words, those investors have
been deceived by the inequality of information. Hence insider trading
can "operate as a fraud or deceit," as is required to establish a Rule iob5(c) violation.54
Because liability is premised on Rule iob-5, the SEC or a private
plaintiff trying to prevail on an insider trading claim must necessarily
establish the elements necessary for any violation of the rule. These
elements include materiality and scienter." Thus, it must be established

49. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 40 F.2d at 833, 848 (holding that corporate insiders and their tippees
were subject to SEC enforcement action for trading on material nonpublic information); 4 HAZEN,
supra note 2. As discussed below, this early application of the disclose or abstain rule was significantly
modified by the Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.

222, 223-24

('980), which

overturned the conviction of a financial printer's employee based on knowingly trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information. Though Chiarella overturned certain aspects of the
Texas Gulf Sulphur holding, the aspects of the holding that remain unmodified demonstrate that the
law prohibiting classical insider trading by insiders is well-settled and straightforward. Cf In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 4o S.E.C. 907 (1961) (stock broker sanctioned for passing material inside information
on to customers); Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1322 n.15 (1999).
50. Ordinarily, it will be up to the company and its management

to decide when to disclose
nonpublic information. An insider who prematurely discloses this information to enable a trade would
be acting for selfish purposes rather than in the interests of the company that entrusted the insider
with the information, and thus could face liability for such disclosure. Cf Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248
N.E.2d 9io (NY. 1969) (holding that corporate insiders cannot use confidential information for their
own advantage); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. 1949) (same); accord In re ORFA Sec.
Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449 (D.N.J. 1987).
51. See, e.g., Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 40! F.2d at 833 (discussing when insiders may trade after the
information has been disclosed).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 24.Io(b)5(c) (2009); see also, e.g, O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642; Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833; In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. 907.

53. An issue not addressed in this Article is the extent to which someone who obtains the
information from an insider can be guilty of insider trading. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); 4
HAZEN, supra note 2, § 12. 17(5); see also supra note 9.
54. 17 CEFR. § 24o.Io(b)5.
55 SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47,5So (1st Cir. 1983).
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that the nonpublic information was "material."5 6 Materiality is a concept
borrowed from common law fraud for determining which misstatements
are actionable and which are not." A fact is material if, considering the
total mix of publicly available information, there is "a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important."58
In addition, the defendant must have acted with the intent to deceive, or
"scienter," another concept borrowed from the common law,59 which is
generally interpreted to include severely reckless conduct.
In contrast to the relatively straightforward nature of classical
insider trading, the law of outsider trading is both complex and
confusing. The next Part addresses the puzzle of identifying those
persons who are subject to Rule iob-5's disclose or abstain rule, on the
basis that they misappropriated or otherwise wrongfully obtained and
used the information in making securities trades.

II.
A.

THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY AND RULE IOb5-26r

CHIARELLA AND EARLY MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY

Notwithstanding prior case law to the contrary, the Supreme Court
in Chiarella held that there is no duty to disclose-and hence no
prohibition on trading-based solely on the possession of material
nonpublic inside information.2 The Court reasoned that in the absence
of a wrongful conversion or misappropriation of the information, no
requisite fraud or deception has occurred within the meaning of section
io(b), since traders in securities have no general duty to disclose material

56. "For the securities lawyer, 'materiality' is the name of the game." RICHARD W. JENNINGS &
HAROLD MARSH, JR., SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1023-25 (5th ed. 1982); see Tex.
Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (discussing materiality in the context of an insider trading case): see also
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (accepting the Texas Gulf Sulphur approach to materiality
in a case that did not involve insider trading).
57. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § io8 (5th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (discussing materiality under the common law).
58. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); accord Basic Inc., 485 U.S. 224.
For an extended discussion of materiality, see 4 HAZEN, supra note 2. § 12.10.
59. See Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 57.
§ io7 (discussing misrepresentation and the range of court reactions).
6o. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 3o8, 327 (2007) (discussing proof of
scienter); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 68o, 701-02 (1980) (the scienter requirement applies to both private
and SEC enforcement actions); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (holding that
scienter is an element of a Rule iob-5 violation: reserving the question of whether reckless conduct is
sufficient); see also 4 HAZEN, supra note 2, § 12.8(3).
61. Thousands of pages have been written on the scope of insider trading liability and the
misappropriation theory in particular. A rehash of the development is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a complete discussion of the evolution of the misappropriation theory, see 4 HAZEN, Supra
note 2,

§ 12.17(4).

62. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980) (overturning conviction of financial
printer's employee based on knowingly trading while in possession of material nonpublic information).
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nonpublic information prior to trading.63 Consequently, by itself, trading
on the basis of such information is not sufficient to establish a violation
of section io(b) (nor, it follows, of Rule Job-5). Instead, liability for
outsider trading requires something more.64 Thus, for example, after
Chiarella it became clear that someone who simply overhears
confidential material information is free to trade on it.65
But though the Court in Chiarella rejected outsider trading liability
based on nothing more than trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information, the Court explicitly left open whether a different
theory could have sustained Mr. Chiarella's conviction. Though the issue
was not before it, the Court suggested in dicta that Mr. Chiarella's
employment relationship could create a duty to his employer not to
misappropriate confidential information learned in the course of his
employment, a necessary adjunct of such a duty being the duty not to
trade on such information.6 This came to be known as the
"misappropriation theory" of Iob-5 liability for trading on confidential
nonpublic information.
In the years following Chiarella, several federal courts of appeals
adopted the misappropriation theory.6 7 When the Fourth68 and Eighth 69

63. Id. at 23 1-35; see also Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1982)

(defendant owning the largest single block of stock, but not a controlling interest, had no duty to
disclose under Chiarella); cf Arst v. Stifel Nicolaus & Co., 871 F. Supp. 1370, 1384 (D. Kan. 1994)

(holding that broker did not have a fiduciary relationship with customer so as to impose on the broker
a duty to disclose information about securities customer wanted to sell), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 86
F.3d 973, 979 (ioth Cir. 1996) (holding that broker breached his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
purchases on his own account and thus was not entitled to summary judgment on that claim).
64. But cf 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2009) (prohibiting trading in advance of announced tender
offers and purporting to apply to any person other than the person making the tender offer regardless
of a special duty or relationship); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991)
(upholding conviction for violating Rule 14e-3 but finding no iob-5 violation due to the absence of a
duty); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 675-76 (1997) (upholding Rule 14e-3 but not deciding

whether it could be violated without a duty sufficient to violate Rule rob-5).
65. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (football coach did not violate

Rule iob-5 when he traded on information he overheard from a conversation involving an insider).
66. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-36. Two subsequent cases involving printers' employees used the
misappropriation rationale to find Rule iob-5 violations by defendants in a position similar to
Chiarella's. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding an SEC complaint seeking
injunctive relief and disgorgement of profits in an action against a proofreader who allegedly
"misappropriated" tender offer information from a financial printer); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp.
1028, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (employee of printer held accountable for misappropriation).
67. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming insider trading violation based

on misappropriation by employee); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986)
(affirming securities fraud conviction based on misappropriation theory), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 484 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1987); SEC v. Clark, 699 F. Supp. 839, 842 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (adopting
misappropriation theory for insider trading enforcement action); see also Barbara Aldave, The
Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 Omo Sr. L.J. 373, 391 (1988) (arguing
against a statutory definition of insider trading).
68. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1995) (overturning securities fraud
conviction based on misappropriation of nonpublic information); United States v. ReBrook, III, 58
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Circuits subsequently rejected it, the stage was set for the Supreme Court
to resolve the split, which it did in United States v. O'Hagan by adopting
the theory.o The essence of the misappropriation theory is the existence
of a fiduciary or other relationship that imposes a duty not to trade on
confidential information obtained by reason of such relationship. The
existence of that duty triggers the concomitant disclose or abstain
obligation, violation of which results in trading liability." The relevant
decisions reveal serious problems in trying to identify the relationships
sufficient to implicate the misappropriation theory.

B. THE SEC's RESPONSE: RULE Iob5-2
The misappropriation cases provided a case-by-case rather than
systematic analysis of the scope of the misappropriation theory of
outsider trading liability. In 1999, the SEC proposed Rule Iob5-2 to
establish a nonexclusive rule as to the scope of misappropriation
liability. 2 The rule was adopted in 2000.73 Under Rule Iob5-2, there are
three non-exclusive bases for determining that a duty of trust or
confidence was owed by a person receiving information: (i) when the
person agreed to keep information confidential; (2) when the persons
involved in the communication had a history, pattern, or practice of
sharing confidences that resulted in a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality; and (3) when the person who provided the information
was a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person who received the
information, unless it were shown affirmatively, based on the facts and
circumstances of that family relationship, that there was no reasonable
expectation of confidentiality.74

F-3d 961 (4th Cir. 1995).
69. United States v. O'Hagan,

92 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); see also
David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: The Demise of the MisappropriationTheory-and Thereafter, 41

ST. LouIs U. L.J. 625 (1997) (bemoaning a narrow view of the misappropriation theory).
70. 521 U.S. 642. State law has similarly invoked misappropriation as a basis for illegal insider
trading. See, e.g., People v. Napolitano, 724 N.Y.S. 2d 702, 708 (App. Div. zooi) (holding insider
trading based on misappropriation of information was criminal violation of New York securities law).
71. Not every misuse of information will constitute a Rule iob-5 violation. Thus, for example, as
discussed below, it has been held that straight theft of information without a breach of fiduciary duty
will not constitute a Rule iob-5 duty to disclose or abstain from trading. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574
F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2oo9).
72. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-42259,

Exchange Act Release No. 33-7787, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24209, 71 SEC Docket
732 (Dec. 20, 1999) (proposing release).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.iob5-2 (2009); see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act

Release No. 33-7881, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. IC24599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716-ol (Aug. 15, 2000) (adopting release); see also Peter J. Romeo & Alan L.
Dye, The SEC's New Insider Trading Rules, 34 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIEs REG. I (2001).
74. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-42259,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-7787, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-242o9, 71 SEC Docket
732

(Dec. 20, 1999). Rule Iob5-2 provides:
This section provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a
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A number of cases have questioned the breadth of the SEC's rule.
In dicta, the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Yun questioned Rule iob52(b)(3)'s provision that marriage creates a presumption of a disclose or
abstain obligation emanating from spousal communications.
Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that family relationships can
provide the basis for a confidential relationship sufficient to trigger
insider trading liability.6 A subsequent First Circuit decision found that
confidences passed on from one spouse to another are clothed with a

duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the "misappropriation" theory of insider trading
under Section ro(b) of the Act and Rule lob-5. The law of insider trading is otherwise
defined by judicial opinions construing Rule iob-5, and Rule lob5-2 does not modify the
scope of insider trading law in any other respect.
(a) Scope of Rule. This section shall apply to any violation of Section io(b) of the Act
and § 240.Iob-5 thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of,
or the communication of, material nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a
duty of trust or confidence.
(b) Enumerated "duties of trust or confidence." For purposes of this section, a "duty of

trust or confidence" exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(i) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the
person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know
that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or
her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or
obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with
respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably
should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that the
person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or
practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or
understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
17 C.F.R. § 240.iob5-2 (citation omitted).
75. SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1271-74 (i Ith Cir. 2003). Although the case was not governed by

Rule iob5-2, the court rejected a presumption that the marriage relationship creates a Rule iob-5
duty. The court noted that "the SEC's new rule goes farther than we do in finding a relationship of
trust and confidence (e.g., the new rule creates a presumption of a relationship of trust and
confidentiality in the case of close family members)," but found that prior case law did not go that far.
Id. at 1273 n.23. Since the SEC cannot by rule extend the scope of the section lo(b) beyond what
Congress intended, it would seem to follow that in the court's view Rule Iob5-2 exceeds the scope of
the statute.
76. Id. at 1263 (affirming lower court's determination that the confidentiality of communications
between spouses was a jury question, where jury found that postnuptial negotiations created
confidential relationship so as to support insider trading liability based on a tip of information between
husband and wife, but vacating for new trial
on other grounds); see also Ray J.Grzebielski, Friends,
Family, Fiduciaries:Personal Relationships as a Basis for Insider Trading Violations, 5 I CATH. U. L.
REV. 467 (20o2); Thomas M. Madden, O'Hagan, xob5-2, Relationships and Duties, 4 HASTINGs Bus.
L.J. 55 (2008).
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duty of confidentiality sufficient to establish a Rule Job-5 disclose or
abstain obligation."
Rule Iob5-2 has fared less well in the district courts. In United States
v. Kim, a federal district court in California implicitly raised the question
of whether Rule Iob5-2(b)(2) went too far in finding a duty based on a
mutual expectation of confidentiality that fell short of a binding
agreement." More recently, a federal district court in SEC v. Cuban,'
which is discussed more fully belowt questioned subsection (b)(i) when
it held that a confidentiality agreement regarding material nonpublic
information does not by itself necessarily support a Rule iob-5 duty to
disclose or abstain from trading.8
Notwithstanding the questions raised by the foregoing decisions,
Rule iob5-2 has not been invalidated. It thus remains a force to be
reckoned with. Unless the rule is stricken by a court or rescinded by the
SEC, people conducting transactions with access to nonpublic
information must be mindful of the three situations in which a duty of
confidentiality is presumed under the rule. It is also important to note
that although Rule Job5-2 clarifies three situations in which the
misappropriation theory applies, it does not preclude finding a duty of
confidentiality in other situations as well.8' Indeed, Rule iob5-2 is
nonexclusive and continues to serve as a basis for identifying additional
circumstances and relationships sufficient to trigger Rule iob-5 duties.
As noted above, Rule Iob5-2 establishes a bright-line rule under
which the receipt of information from a spouse, parent, child, or sibling
will provide a sufficient basis for presuming outsider trading liability,
assuming that all other elements are satisfied.83 The rule further includes

77. SEC. v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 13-14 (2oo6) (finding that wife breached duty to her husband
when she obtained nonpublic information with the intention to pass it on to her brother so he could
trade on it to his advantage).
78. 184 F. Supp. 2d xoo6 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In Kim, the defendant was a member of a national
organization, the Young Presidents Organization, whose principles expressly stated: "We operate in
an atmosphere of absolute confidentiality. Nothing discussed in forum will be discussed with outsiders.
Confidentiality, in all ways and for always.' Id. at ioo8. The defendant traded on the basis of
information in violation of this pattern and mutual expectation of confidentiality. Id. at ioo8-o9. The
court held that this was not sufficient to support liability under Rule sob-5. Id. at 1015. The decision
did not directly rule on the validity of Rule iob5-2(b)(2) since the facts of the case arose prior to the
rule's effective date. Nevertheless, the court questioned the rule's validity. Id. at 1014-15.
Furthermore, if the court was correct that dismissal was mandated by the terms of section io(b), then
Rule Iob5-2(b)(2) is overbroad since the SEC cannot by rule extend the scope of the statute.
79. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
8o. See infra Part III.B.
81. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
82. See, e.g., Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d ioll ("T]he primary essential characteristic of the fiduciary

relation is some measure of superiority, dominance, or control.").
83. 17 C.F.R. § 24o.1ob5-2(b)(3) (2009); see supra Part I (discussing the other elements of a Rule
lob-5 violation); see also SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (Iuth Cir. 2003) (affirming lower court's
determination whether communications between spouses were confidential was a jury question, where
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an affirmative defense that permits the family member to rebut the
presumption that a duty of confidence exists by showing that he or she
did not know, and reasonably should not have known, that the insiderfamily member communicating the information had an expectation of
confidentiality.4
The bright-line test that Rule iob5-2 purports to establish has been
seriously clouded by the two district court decisions noted above. In
particular, the Kim , and Cuban" cases question Rule Lob5-2(b)(2)'s
inclusion of a pattern or history of an expectation of confidentiality;
those cases suggested that such a provision was beyond the scope of
section io(b)." The Cuban case also indicates that not all confidentiality
agreements will necessarily encompass a nonuse agreement sufficient to
fall within the rule.? We must await further judicial clarification of the
issues raised in those cases before being able to judge whether the courts
will in fact recognize the proper breadth of Rule lob5-29

C.

RULE Iob5-2 LIABILIT BASED ON MISREPRESENTATION

The foregoing cases address the situations and relationships that can
create a duty not to trade based on an expectation of confidentiality. As
discussed above, Rule iob5-2 sets forth a nonexclusive list of situations
and relationships creating such a duty on that basis. Yet there is another
way of looking at trading restrictions in the context of confidentiality
agreements, Kim-style confidentiality understandings, or the marriage
relationship. Rule iob-5 clearly covers trading on material nonpublic
information when that information is acquired by means of an
intentionally deceptive misrepresentation.' Therefore, outsider liability
may be premised on an outsider's wrongful misrepresentation as a means
of obtaining the information, regardless of the outsider's relationship with
the source of the information, fiduciary or otherwise.

jury found that postnuptial negotiations created confidential relationship so as to support insider
trading liability based on a tip of information between husband and wife, but vacating for new trial on
other grounds).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.Iob5-2(b)(3).
85. 173 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
86. 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo8); cf Yun, 327 F.3d at 1263 (holding that it was a jury
question whether interspousal communication triggered the disclose-or-abstain obligation).
88. 634 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
89. See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, FiduciaryDuty and 'Deceptive' FraudulentConduct
Under Rule Tob-5, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 2009, at 2 col. 3 ("Given the split on this issue with the Fifth
Circuit, it is possible that the Supreme Court will review this issue in the near future.").
00. See. e.g.. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009); infra Part III.A (discussing Dorozhko).
See generally Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. I(1985) (discussing the deception
requirement); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (8977) (discussing Rule iob-5's deception
requirement).
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With respect to confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements, the
signing of such an agreement constitutes a representation as to how that
information will be treated. The person who then trades on the
information has in effect misrepresented his or her intent in order to
obtain the information, and that misrepresentation is sufficient to trigger
Rule Job-5 obligations."
A similar analysis holds true for situations like that in Kim. In Kim,
the defendant participated in a business association of young executives
in which membership was subject to an understanding that all
conversations and information related thereto remained confidential.92
Mr. Kim's participation in the organization and assent to those principles
meant that any information obtained at the meeting was acquired
because of his representation regarding confidentiality. The information
that Mr. Kim traded on was thus acquired through a misrepresentation of
confidentiality.
Finally, this misrepresentation analysis also applies in the context of
spousal or other family communications covered by Rule Iob5-2. Even
without an express confidentiality agreement, an implied representation
of confidentiality should be seen as arising out of a continuing "history,
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the
information knows or reasonably should know that the person
communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the
recipient will maintain its confidentiality." A shared expectation of
confidentiality should be sufficient. A misrepresentation analysis thus
supports the breadth of Rule 'ob5-2.

III.

DOROZHKO, CUBAN, AND THE SCOPE OF RULE Iob-5

Notwithstanding Rule Iob5-2's reasoned explication of the
relationship required to trigger outsider trading prohibitions, the recent
cases noted above 94 and several law professors have questioned the
rule's validity. A closer look at the most recent cases sheds further light
on the proper interpretation of Rule Iob-5 in outsider trading cases and
also helps demonstrate that the Rule struck a proper balance within the
bounds of the statute. The following two cases represent ill-advised
partial defeats for the SEC. Courts in subsequent cases should learn from

91. Supra note 90.

92. See 184 F. Supp. 2d ioo6 (N.D. Cal. 2002); supra note 78.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.iob5-2(b)(2) (2009).
94. See supra notes 87-92.
95. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, SEC v. Cuban,
034 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3:o8-cV-o2o5o) (arguing for the invalidity of Rule lob5-2 on
the grounds that a confidentiality agreement is not sufficient since section io(b) requires a fiduciary or
similar duty); see also Nagy, supra note 32 (written prior to the most recent Dorozhko and Cuban
decisions and positing that a fiduciary duty is required by the controlling Supreme Court cases).
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the SEC's partial victories in these two cases and should also reconsider
the issues on which the SEC did not prevail.

A. SEC v. DOROZHKO
A federal district court in New York held that a computer hacker
who broke into a company's files did not violate Rule lob-5.96 The court
noted its surprise that the SEC took the case, rather than passing it on to
the Department of Justice for prosecution on the basis of something
other than the securities laws. In finding the absence of a securities law
violation, the district court reasoned that Rule Iob-5 requires some basis
for imposing a "disclose or abstain" obligation based on the existence of
some duty and it found that none existed on the facts before the court.9'
96. SEC v. Dorozhko, 6o6 F. Supp. 2d 321, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo8) (holding that defendant who

obtained information by illegally hacking into computer file did not owe a fiduciary duty of
nondisclosure and thus was not in violation of Rule xob-5 when he traded stocks based on the illegally
obtained information; suggesting that the defendant could have been prosecuted for crimes not
involving the securities laws or insider trading), rev'd, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2oo9); see Alan R. Kaufman
& James M. Keneally, Theft of Information and Securities Laws, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 2oo8, at 4 col. 4; see
also United States v. Finnerty, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("As the Supreme Court has

made clear... theft by itself does not constitute securities fraud because of the requirement of
deception. Indeed, theft constitutes securities fraud only when it is accompanied by a violation of
fiduciary duty." (citation omitted) (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 f-4 (2002))).
97. In Dorozhko, the court stated:
This case highlights a potential gap arising from a reliance on fiduciary principles in the
legal analysis that courts have employed to define insider trading, and courts' stated goal of
preserving equitable markets. Yet, on further consideration, the gap is not as troublesome
as it may appear, since the government retains ample methods of combating inequitable
practices of the kind alleged here. Indeed, we would not have to address the tension
between the fiduciary requirement and the goal of preserving fair and open markets had the
SEC acted on this Court's suggestion at the November 28, 2oo7 preliminary injunction
hearing that a way to avoid a decision that would result in the release of the restrained
trading proceeds was to refer this matter to the United States Attorney's Office for criminal
investigation. Based on the evidence provided at the November 28, 2007 hearing there
would appear to be sufficient basis to conclude that Dorozhko's hack violated the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, the mail fraud statute, and the wire fraud statute. The U.S.
Attorney's Office has authority to seize Dorozhko's trading proceeds under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(b).
However, since the SEC has apparently declined, for whatever reason, to involve the
criminal authorities in this case, we must address an inconvenient truth about our securities
laws-an issue that has sent Supreme Court justices into dissent and provoked numerous
law review articles.
6o6 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24 (citations omitted).
98. The Court stated:
Upon a searching review of existing case law, and for the reasons that follow, we believe
that we are constrained to hold that Dorozhko's alleged "stealing and trading" or "hacking
and trading" does not amount to a violation of § lo(b) and Rule lob-i because Dorozhko
did not breach any fiduciary or similar duty "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a
security. Although Dorozhko may have broken the law, he is not liable in a civil action
under § so(b) because he owed no fiduciary or similar duty either to the source of his
information or to those he transacted with in the market. As the Supreme Court famously

9oo
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the
SEC's request for a preliminary injunction." Although the Second Circuit
agreed that the hacker was not under a fiduciary duty that would trigger
the disclose or abstain rule, it held that liability could be found even in
the absence of a fiduciary duty.'" The hacker could be held accountable
for the trades under Rule iob-5 to the extent he had acquired the
nonpublic information through a misrepresentation.o' The Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for determination of
whether the hacker obtained the information in a deceptive manner
through a misrepresentation, which would include a misrepresentation of
the hacker's identity. 0 2
There is sparse authority on whether a theft of information is
sufficient to trigger Rule iob-5's disclose or abstain obligation.'" Thus,
held in Chiarella, and has reaffirmed since, "one who fails to disclose material information
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to
do so
Id. at 324 (citations omitted) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (citing
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654-56 (1997)).
99. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 5o-51.

l oo. Id.
IoI. Id. at 5o ("[W]e adopt the SEC's proposed interpretation of Chiarella and its progeny:
'misrepresentations are fraudulent, but ... silence is fraudulent only if there is a duty to disclose.'"
(second alteration in original) (quoting Opening Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
Appellant at 44, Dorozhko, 574 F-3d 42 (No. o8-ozol-cv))). The Second Circuit in Dorozhko, id. at 49,
also pointed to Basic Inc. v. Levinson as "distinguishing 'situations where insiders have traded in
abrogation of their duty to disclose or abstain,' from 'affirmative misrepresentations by those under no
duty to disclose (but under the ever-present duty not to mislead)."' (quoting 485 U.S. 224, 24o n.i8
(1988)).
1o2. The Court explained:
In our view, misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain access to information that is
otherwise off limits, and then stealing that information is plainly "deceptive" within the
ordinary meaning of the word. It is unclear, however, that exploiting a weakness in an
electronic code to gain unauthorized access is "deceptive," rather than being mere theft.
Accordingly, depending on how the hacker gained access, it seems to us entirely possible
that computer hacking could be, by definition, a "deceptive device or contrivance" that is
prohibited by Section io(b) and Rule iob-5.
However, we are hesitant to move from this general principle to a particular application
without the benefit of the District Court's views as to whether the computer hacking in this
case-as opposed to computer hacking in general-was "deceptive."
Id. at 51: see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F-3d 372,
389 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court .. . has established that a device, such as a scheme, is not
'deceptive' unless it involves breach of some duty of candid disclosure." (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
234-35; O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655)).
103. Dorozhko, 6o6 F. Supp. 2d 321 (reversed by the Second Circuit) appears to be the only ruling

on point and even there the court gave the SEC an opportunity to replead its claim. Cf United States
v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (in a case decided before the Supreme Court's O'Hagandecision,
the Fourth Circuit ruled against a claim that stolen information could form the basis of a Rule loh-5
duty but the court based its decision on a rejection of the misappropriation theory that was since
adopted in O'Hagan). The court in Dorozhko also noted that the Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Cherif, 933
F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991), did not reach the issue of whether a theft was sufficient since the thief
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this is far from a settled question. At least one case presented the issue
squarely, but was settled before adjudication on the merits.'04 In that
case, the SEC filed charges under Rule Iob-5 against someone who snuck
into his brother-in-law's bedroom, hacked his computer files, and traded
on the material nonpublic information he thereby acquired.o' The parties
reached a settlement that included disgorgement and a fine.'o Until
definitively decided by more courts, there remains a plausible argument
that someone who steals inside information in order to trade to his or her
advantage may be held accountable under Rule l ob-5. As noted above,
this most certainly would be the case if the theft was enabled by a
misrepresentation."o8 But drawing a distinction between deceptive and
non-deceptive

theft

is

not easy'"-and

as

a

matter

of

sound

was a former employee who breached a duty imposed by the employment relationship. See Dorozhko,
6o6 F. Supp. 2d at 339-40.
104. See SEC v. Stummer, Litigation Release No. 20529, 93 SEC Docket I15 (Apr. 17, 2oo8). The
defendant entered into a consent decree and agreed to pay $46,386.66, "representing the disgorgement
of his illegal trading profits, prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty in an amount equal to the
profits." Id.
105. Id.

xo6. Id.
107. As the district court in Dorozhko, acknowledged, two leading authorities support the view

that stolen information can form the basis of Rule xob-5's obligation not to trade on material
nonpublic information. See 6o6 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (citing 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 9, § 6:14; Robert
A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challengesfor the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 263, 296-307 (1999)); see also SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d i (ist Cir. 2oo6) (although there was

no basis for a traditional fiduciary duty, a spouse's alleged acquisition of insider information from her
husband so that she could alert her brother was deceptive and occurred in connection with the
brother's sale of his securities); Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 6o8 (2oo8)
("[G]iven courts' expansion of the misappropriation theory from a narrow version in 'Hagan to the
endorsement of the broader liability in Rule rob5-2, Rocklage's removal of the fiduciary requirement,
and the reinvigoration of the version of the misappropriation theory originally outlined in the
Chiarella dissent, one is left with the inescapable conclusion that mere thieves are liable for insider
trading under Rule iob-5."); cf Langevoort, supra note 40, at 1298 ("[The] principal drafters [of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act] regarded those who trade on material confidential information as
'thieves,' deserving substantial penalties."). But see Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote
Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 18l, 221 (2005) ("The burglar and computer hacker may be liable for the
conversion of nonpublic information under other laws, but the insider trading laws themselves appear
not to prohibit the burglar or hacker from trading or tipping on the basis of the stolen information.
This is because there was no breach of a duty of loyalty to traders under the classic theory or to the
source of the information under the misappropriation theory."), quoted in Dorozhko, 6o6 F. Supp. 2d
at 341-42.
xo8. See supra notes 99--o2 and accompanying text.
1o9.

See, e.g., Howard W. Goldstein, 'Outsiders' as 'Insiders': Recent Insider Trading Cases,

N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 2oo9, at 5.

[A] thief who steals a lawyer's wallet, uses his card key to gain access to the law firm's
premises, sees information on an open computer, and then trades on that information, has
arguably misrepresented his identity to gain access and is liable for securities fraud, even
though no person has been defrauded. But what if the thief is legitimately on the law firm's
premises delivering lunch to a conference room and, while on the premises, picks the lock
on an office to obtain confidential information? Is that "deceiving the lock" (fraud), or is it
exploiting a security weakness (theft)?
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jurisprudence, the utility and rationality of making outsider trading
liability turn on such a distinction is open to question.
The Dorozhko court's rationale leads to uneven results in two fact
situations involving wrongdoing that have the same impact on the
securities markets. Consider the impact of Dorozhko in the following
situations. A thief who misrepresents his identity so that he can obtain
nonpublic information in order to trade securities on the basis of
knowledge that is superior to that of other market participants violates
Rule Iob-5. However, an ordinary thief is treated differently. Thus, for
example, the thief who breaks and enters will not violate Rule Lob-5, but
the thief who uses false identification to obtain entry and then trades on
the information has violated the securities laws. This seems a bit
anomalous since both thieves' conduct have the same deceptive impact
on the securities markets, and Rule Iob-5(c) prohibits conduct that
operates as a fraud or deceit." 0 Unfortunately, this anomalous result is
not uncommon to Rule Iob-5 and insider trading. For example, as noted
earlier, Rule iob-5 was violated when a psychiatrist took advantage of
confidential information obtained from a patient,"' but not by a
stockbroker who traded on nonpublic information provided by a
customer who himself wanted to take advantage of the nonpublic
information."2
As noted above, Rule Job-5(c) prohibits conduct that operates as a
fraud or deceit. This means that courts need to look to the functional
impact of the conduct."' Therefore, if an outsider wrongfully obtains
information with the scienter or intent to trade required by section ro(b),
this should be covered by Rule iob-5. The requisite statutory deception
could be found in the investors' reliance on the integrity of the market, in
the same way that the Supreme Court allowed a fraud-on-the-market
approach to establish a presumption of reliance." 4 The weakness in this
argument is that it comes close to the fact pattern in Chiarella, which
held that something more than knowing use of nonpublic information is
required to violate Rule lob-5."' However, the argument that a Rule
iob-5 violation can be premised on the knowing use of wrongfully

Id.
iio. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.iob-5(c) (2009).
iii. See SEC v. Willis, 825 F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
I12. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551. 555-56, 571 (2d Cir. i99).
113. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 68o, 692 (3980) (holding that identical "operates as a fraud or deceit"

language in section 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3), allowed the SEC to proceed
without proving scienter as would be required in a Rule iob-5 claim).
i14. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224. 225 (1988) (permitting a presumption of reliance
based on the efficient capital market hypothesis, which posits that investors should be able to rely on
the market price as a fair reflection of publicly available information). For discussion of fraud on the
market, see 4 HAZEN, supra note 2, § 32.30(6).
I11S. 445 U.S. 222, 235 (3980).
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obtained nonpublic information was not made in the Chiarella case. In
Chiarella, a printer's employee traded on information obtained in a notyet-public tender offer filing being printed by the defendant's
employer." 6 The Court's opinion noted that had a breach of duty been
alleged based on the defendant's employment relationship, a violation
might have been shown."' Several years later, in United States v.
O'Hagan, the Supreme Court made it clear that the employment
relationship would suffice." 8 The issue discussed herein is another
question left unanswered by the Chiarella decision-what type of
wrongdoing is sufficient to trigger the disclose or abstain obligation. As is
clear from the discussion that follows, Rule xob-5 liability is not limited
to breaches of a fiduciary duty."9
B.

SEC v.

CUBAN

Many of the cases involving the misappropriation theory are based
on a fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship.' 20 But the misappropriation
theory can also be applied in the absence of a fiduciary relationship when
the information has been supplied under a confidentiality agreement, at
least where the agreement prohibits both disclosure and use of the
information."' There is conflicting authority as to whether the existence

I16. Id.

at 224.

117. Id. at 235-36.

ii8. 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997). The defendant in O'Hagan was an attorney who learned of
nonpublic information emanating from a firm's client. Id. at 647-48. O'Hagan was not working on the
case and thus was not directly bound by the attorney-client privilege to keep the information
confidential. See id. at 647. On the other hand, the Court found sufficient deception based on
O'Hagan's trading on the information and thereby deceiving the law firm from which the information
came. Id. at 666.
iI9. Professor Nagy suggests that additional SEC rulemaking is necessary to include other
wrongdoing as a basis for insider or outsider trading liability. See Nagy, supra note 32, at 1379.
("[W]hile this view can be justified by the policy objectives underlying the Supreme Court's decisions,
it currently lacks a solid doctrinal foundation."). Professor Nagy recommends that the Supreme Court
adopt an interpretation and the SEC engage in rulemaking that focuses on the impact on investors
under a "fraud on investors" theory. Id. at 1374-78. My view is that, although it would be helpful for
the Supreme Court to adopt a broader theory of section io(b), it is both unlikely and unnecessary
since Rule iob-5(c) and existing case law support such an interpretation with respect to: ()
confidentiality agreements, (2) circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of confidentiality,
and (3) certain close family relationships. See infra notes 129-3o and accompanying text. Professor
Nagy and I agree, however, that the current murky state of the case law could be remedied by
congressional action. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text. Congress is currently considering
a number of regulatory reforms in the wake of the financial crisis of 2oo8-2009. This presents a good
opportunity to revisit insider trading as well. As pointed out below, even with expansive interpretation
of existing law, the law of insider and outsider trading likely will remain muddled unless Congress acts
by adopting a statutory definition setting forth a brighter line of when trading prohibitions come into
play.
120. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (attorney in law firm clothed with attorney-client
obligations); SEC v. Willis, 825 F. Supp. at 6i8 (psychiatrist/patient relationship).
121. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. TeX. 2009).
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of a confidentiality agreement is enough, in and of itself, to create a
fiduciary relationship between the contracting parties.' The discussion
that follows focuses on identifying a fiduciary or fiduciary-like
relationship sufficient to trigger the disclose or abstain rule as well as
what types of confidentiality agreements will be sufficient.
In SEC v. Cuban, the SEC brought insider trading charges based on
a breach of a confidentiality agreement regarding a company's plan to
engage in a private investment in public equity (PIPE) offering.' An
amicus brief filed by a number of law professors unsuccessfully urged
that Rule Iob5-2 is overly broad.'2 4 They argued that the enabling
statute-section io(b)-only authorizes the SEC to promulgate liability
rules based on fraudulent conduct, which in turn requires-under the
misappropriation theory announced by the Supreme Court in
O'Hagan-the breach of a fiduciary or functionally equivalent duty, as
opposed to a merely contractual one.' The amici reasoned that if Rule
Job5-2 were construed to extend section io(b) liability to situations
involving the mere breach of a confidentiality agreement, the rule would
create liability for trading on nonpublic information in the absence of a
statutorily sufficient fraud." 6 This would go beyond the regulatory
authority granted to the SEC and would render the rule invalid as overly
broad. The amicus brief's essential argument was that when a defendant
trades on the basis of nonpublic information obtained pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement, he does not commit fraud within the meaning
of section io(b), since he is not a fiduciary of the source of the
information and thus has no duty to disclose or abstain from trading.'2 7 In
122. See Goscicki v. Custom Brass & Copper Specialties, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 743, 757 (E.D. Mich.
2002) ("[Fiduciary] relationships may be found to exist either by virtue of an express confidentiality

non-use/non-disclosure agreement or, in appropriate circumstances, may be implied by law."); Larsen
v. Consol. Pet Foods, Inc., 144 B.R. 121, 162 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (finding confidentiality agreement
between parties created a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law). But see Barrett v. Freifeld, 64
A.D.3d 736, 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) ("The creation of a fiduciary duty does not depend upon the
existence of an agreement or contract between the parties, but results from the relationship between
the fiduciary and the beneficiary."); MobiApps, Inc. v. Quake Global. Inc., No. o6cv1745-LAB (JMA),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34681, at *22 n.3 (S.D. Cal. May 9, 2007) ("The existence of confidentiality

agreements supports an inference that no fiduciary relationship was established or intended.").
123. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18, 723; see also, e.g., SEC v. Lyon, 605 F. Supp. 2d 531. 550
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding SEC complaint against insiders who made short sales prior to public
announcement of pending PIPE offering).
124. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d
713 (No. 3:o8-cv-02050) (arguing for the invalidity of Rule iob5-2 on the grounds that a breach of a

confidentiality agreement is not sufficient to support liability under section lo(b) since liability under
that section requires a breach of a fiduciary or similar duty).
125. See id. at 2; SEC's Case Against Cuban Looks Set for Long Fight as Academics Join Fray,
[Jan.-June] 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 295 (Feb. 23, 2009); see also Nagy, supra note 32,
at 3317 (written prior to the most recent Dorozhko and Cuban decisions and positing that a fiduciary
duty is required by the controlling Supreme Court cases).
126. See Brief of Amici Curiaein Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 124.
127.

Id.

March 20Io]

PROHIBITING OUTSIDER TRADING

905

the absence of a duty to disclose or refrain, he cannot be held liable for
outsider trading under section io(b).
Contrary to the position urged by the law professors' amicus brief,
the better view, and the one accepted by the federal district court in
Cuban,,8 is that a breach of contractual obligation can be sufficient to
ground a section io(b) violation. The applicable statutory language of
section io(b) plainly creates broad liability for "deceptive" conduct' 2 9 nowhere does it limit the SEC's rulemaking authority to prohibitions on
trading conduct involving breaches of fiduciary duty. Promising to
uphold a confidence and then breaching the duty so created can properly
be characterized as "deceptive." It follows that Rule Lob5-2 is not
beyond the SEC's rulemaking authority and, accordingly, breach of a
contractual confidentiality agreement should be able to form the basis of
a Rule iob-5 outsider trading violation. 30
Notwithstanding the SEC's arguments to the contrary, the district
court dismissed the insider trading claim against Mr. Cuban.' 3' The court,
however, gave the SEC leave to file an amended complaint.13 Although
2

128. See 634 F. Supp. 2d at 723-25.

129. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2oo6 & Supp. 2oo8) (addressing "manipulative or deceptive device[s] or
contrivance[s]").
130. See SEC v. Nothern, 598 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175-76 (D. Mass. 2009).
Nothern contends, to the contrary, that a confidentiality agreement between Davis and
Treasury is insufficient to create a relationship underlying any § io(b) liability. In support of
that contention, Nothern cites United States v. Kim, which held that an express
"Confidentiality Commitment" between members of a social club for business executives
did not give rise to any legal duty because it failed to set forth "a relationship with the
hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship." That case is inapposite for two reasons.
First, as the court itself noted in Kim, the language of Confidentiality Commitment
"appealed only to the members' ethics and morality" and did not create a legal duty to
refrain from disclosing confidential information. Here, the facts alleged by the SEC, if true,
indicate that the agreement between Davis and Anderson created a contractual duty not to
disclose embargoed Treasury information.
Second, Kim relies on the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Chestman, which, in turn, held that a "similar relationship of trust and
confidence" must be the "functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship," meaning that it
must be characterized by superiority or dominance. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d at xoil-Ii (citing
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568). The Second Circuit later clarified that holding, without
reference to the existence of superiority or dominance ....
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d ioo6, ion (N.D. Cal. 2002)); see
also, e.g., United States v. Falcone, 257 F. 3 d 226, 234-35 (2d Cir. 200) ("[A] fiduciary relationship, or

its functional equivalent, exists only where there is explicit acceptance of a duty of confidentiality or
where such acceptance may be implied from a similar relationship of trust and confidence between the
parties. Qualifying relationships are marked by the fact that the party in whom confidence is reposed
has entered into a relationship in which he or she acts to serve the interests of the party entrusting him
or her with such information."); SEC v. Lyon, 6o5 F. Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding SEC
complaint against insiders who made short sales prior to public announcement of pending PIPE
offering).
131. See Cuban, 634 F.Supp. 2d at 733.
332. See id. The SEC let the court enter judgment without filing an amended complaint, thus
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it dismissed the initial complaint, the court's ruling in Cuban rejected a
number of the defendant's attempts to narrow Rule iob-5 liability for
outsider trading." The court nevertheless accepted the questionable
defense that a confidentiality agreement, as opposed to a nonuse
agreement, cannot be sufficient by itself to invoke the disclose or abstain
rule with respect to securities trading.134
The district court in Cuban quite properly rejected the defendant's
contention that the existence of a fiduciary duty was to be determined
exclusively as a matter of state law.' The court also properly rejected
the defendant's argument that the disclose or abstain rule applies only if
there is a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty.136 The court thus acknowledged
that a nonuse agreement would be sufficient to trigger the disclose or
abstain rule, even if the parties did not stand in a fiduciary relationship.'3 7
However, the district court held that an agreement to keep information
confidential is not sufficient to trigger the disclose or abstain rule unless
the agreement prohibits trading on the information in question.13 This

signaling the appeal that followed. See Court Enters Judgment for Cuban, Allowing for SEC Appeal to
Fifth Circuit, 41 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1520 (Aug. 17, 2oog), available at httpi/
news.bna.com/srln/SRLNWB/splitdisplay.adp?fedfid=1414i673&vname=srlrnotallissues&fn=I4141673&j

d=aob9k4v3b9&split=o. As this Article went to press, the SEC's appeal was pending. See Brief of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff-Appellant, SEC v. Cuban, No. o9-1o996 (5th Cir. Jan.
22, 20oo), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/briefs/2olo/cubanbriefoi io.pdf.
133. 634 F. Supp. 2d at 724-25.
134. Id. at 730-31.
135. Id. at 721-22. The court thus refused to agree with plaintiff's reliance on Southwest Realty,
Ltd. v. Daseke, No. CA3-89-3o55-D, 1992 WL 373166, at *9-lo (N.D. Tex. May 21, 1992), for the
proposition that state law was the proper measure of fiduciary obligations in insider trading cases. See
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 721-22. The court stated:
Moreover, although the source of a duty adequate to support insider trading liability can
be found in state law-this certainly appears to be the case, for example, in O'Hagan-it
may be located elsewhere without violating the general rule against creating federal
common law. The SEC can promulgate a rule that imposes such a duty, provided the rule
conforms with the SEC's rulemaking powers, such as those found in § io(b) of the
Exchange Act. In doing so, the SEC does not create federal general common law.
Id. at 722 (citation omitted).
136. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 724-25.
137. Id.
138. Id. ("The agreement, however, must consist of more than an express or implied promise

merely to keep information confidential. It must also impose on the party who receives the
information the legal duty to refrain from trading on or otherwise using the information for personal

gain."). The court similarly rejected the SEC's reliance on Rule iob5-2()(a):
Because Rule Iob5-2(b)(i) attempts to predicate misappropriation theory liability on a

mere confidentiality agreement lacking a non-use component, the SEC cannot rely on it to
establish Cuban's liability under the misappropriation theory. To permit liability based on
Rule xob5-2(b)(I) would exceed the SEC's § io(b) authority to proscribe conduct that is
deceptive. This is because, as the court has explained, under the misappropriation theory of
liability, it is the undisclosed use of confidential information for personal benefit, in breach

of a duty not to do so, that constitutes the deception.
Id. at 730-31 (citation omitted) (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 65x (1997) ("Liability
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conclusion was based on the rationale that "[w]ith respect to confidential
information, nondisclosure and non-use are logically distinct."' 39 This
conclusion is highly questionable, especially in the context of trading in
securities. 40 The court could easily have avoided the distinction it drew
between confidentiality and nonuse agreements by implying nonuse from
confidentiality as a legal presumption.
Even if it is assumed there is a meaningful distinction between
confidentiality and nonuse agreements for trading purposes, it would
seem natural to imply nonuse from an agreement to keep information
confidential. The court itself acknowledged that a complaint alleging an
implied nonuse agreement could be sufficient.' 4' Thus, even without a
presumed implication of nonuse from a confidentiality agreement, a
nonuse agreement could still be implied under appropriate
circumstances. Given Mr. Cuban's status as a large shareholder of the
company requiring the confidentiality agreement, it would be reasonable
to permit the fact finder to imply a nonuse agreement without requiring
the SEC to file an amended'complaint."
Under classical insider trading, a company insider clearly could not
do what Mr. Cuban did and trade to his or her advantage based on
nonpublic information about a company's pending PIPE offering.'4 3
According to the evidence, even Mr. Cuban recognized that he was likely
in a position where he could not trade." The courts have long recognized

under Rule iob-5, our precedent indicates, does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by § io(b)'s
prohibition.")).

139.

Id. at 723. Pointing to O'Hagan, the court reasoned:

A person who receives material, nonpublic information may in fact preserve the
confidentiality of that information while simultaneously using it for his own gain. Indeed,
the nature of insider trading is such that one who trades on material, nonpublic information
refrains from disclosing that information to the other party to the securities transaction. To
do so would compromise his advantageous position.

Id. at 725 (citing O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 656).
14o. The facts of the Cuban case present a particularly good case for implying a nonuse agreement

since the defendant's position as a major shareholder meant that he had a preexisting special
relationship with the company. See id. at 717, 720.
141. Id. at 724-25.

142. Cf Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 63 (1984) ("[T]he legitimate policy concerns about insider
trading are really concerns about the proper allocation of property rights in valuable information. The

Supreme Court's recent opinions in Dirks and Chiarella, by focusing on the fiduciary duty owed by
traders to the owners of insider information, employ a method of analysis consistent with this
hypothesis.").
143. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), and its progeny make it clear
that a company insider is under a disclose or abstain obligation. The premise of classical insider

trading has been accepted in all of the Supreme Court's insider trading decisions. See, e.g., O'Hagan,
521 U.S. at 651-52 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 44 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463
'Well, now I'm screwed. I
Cuban said:
144. Cuban, 634 F. Supp.2d at717. ("At the end of the call
can't sell.'"). There was evidence to support the company's expectation that Mr. Cuban would not use
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the concept of a "temporary insider"' 45 with respect to someone who has
access to nonpublic information because of his or her relationship with
the company.46This could have been applied to Mr. Cuban's situation.
Rule lob-5 tippee liability would also have resulted if a company
insider had passed on the information to an outsider in order to allow the

the information given under the confidentiality agreement:
Two internal company emails quoted in the complaint indicate that the executive chairman
of Mamma.com may have expected that Cuban would not sell his shares until after the
PIPE was announced. .. . [Cuban] said he would sell his shares (recognizing that he was not
able to do anything until we announce the equity)[.]" . . . "[Cuban's] answers were: he would
not invest, he does not want the company to make acquisitions, he will sell his shares which
he can not [sic] do until after we announce.").
Id. (second, third, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Complaint 991 5,
20, Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (No. 3:o8-CV-2o50-D))
145. See United States v. Rafferty, 296 F. App'x 788, 793-95 (1ith Cir. 2008) (affirming
conviction); SEC. v. Rocklage, 470 F-3d i, 14 (2oo6) (upholding claim against defendant as a
temporary insider); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d jo86 (2d Cir. 1987) (imposing liability on temporary
insider); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 6io F. Supp. 2d 6oo, 649-5o (S.D. Tex.
2009) (discussing temporary insider); Wehrenberg v. Fed. Signal Corp., No. o6 C 487, 2oo8 WL
2787438, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2oo8) (question of fact as to whether defendant was a temporary
insider); Quaak v. Dexia, S.A., 445 F. Supp. 2d 130, 151 (D. Mass. 2oo6) (finding banker was
temporary insider); SEC v. Downe, No. 92 Civ 4092 (PKL), 1993 WL 22126, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
1993) (sufficient allegations that defendant was a temporary insider); United States v. Victor Teicher
& Co., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (acknowledging temporary insider status as a basis
for insider trading violation); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983). But see Langevoort,
supra note 40, at 1288 (1984) ("The Lund decision is largely inconsistent with the recent Dirks case. In
Dirks, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that fiduciary responsibility can arise simply
from the receipt of confidential information, absent either some manifestation of assent by the
outsider to some fiduciary obligations or participation in a breach of fiduciary duty creating tippee
status."); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic

Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1132 (1985) (questioning whether the Supreme Court would accept the
decision in SEC v. Lund that recognized temporary insider status).
146. A number of leading commentators have acknowledged temporary insider status. See, e.g.. 3C
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 19:53 (2oo9)
("The [Report of House Committee on Energy and Commerce] also made it clear that under its
conception of the substantive law, in addition to conventional insiders, so-called 'temporary insiders'
(that is, persons such as lawyers and investment bankers to whom insiders have confided nonpublic
information with the expectation that it remain confidential) have a duty not to trade on the basis of
inside information."); 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIs D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 6:307 (2009) (acknowledging temporary insider as basis
for insider trading liability); 18 LANGEVOORT, supra note 9, § 3.8 (same); I WANG & STEINBERG, supra
note 9, § 5:2.3(D) (discussing "temporary insiders who are neither employees nor independent
contractors"); Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 1o5 MICH. L. REV. 1899. 1922 (2007) ("The rules against insider
trading are meant to protect public companies and investors from theft of information that properly
belongs to them. Insiders such as executives or directors, and 'temporary insiders' such as attorneys,
accountants, financial printers, and investment bankers routinely obtain confidential information
about a company in the course of their work. The insider trading rules are intended to prevent both
these permanent and temporary insiders from abusing their positions of trust by trading in violation of

their legal duties of confidentiality."): D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1420 (zoo2) (referring to temporary insiders' accountability under Rule
lob-5).
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outsider to profit from trading on the information.147 It would have been
completely consistent with Rule Iob-5 precedent to have found an
implied nonuse agreement flowing directly from the express
nondisclosure agreement. To do otherwise, as the Cuban court did, can
be seen as turning the tipper/tippee cases on their heads.'" For example,
if the court's distinction between a nondisclosure and a nonuse
agreement prevails in other cases, companies entering into
confidentiality agreements that do not include nonuse could be seen as
knowingly sanctioning trading on nonpublic information. If a company
agrees to a confidentiality agreement that is found to fall short of a
nonuse agreement, the result would be to enable trading on the
nonpublic information. This would be an unfortunate result that would
enable trading when it should be prohibited, as it would under an
analogy to tipper/tippee liability. 49 A company passing on sensitive
information with a confidentiality agreement not including a nonuse
agreement thus could be seen as acting with reckless disregard as to
147. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-60 (1983). Tippee liability is discussed in 4 HAZEN, supra
note 2, § 12.17(5).
148. In fact, the Court in Dirks acknowledged the concept of a temporary insider:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately
to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these
outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this
fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but
rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate
purposes.... For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect the
outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the relationship at
least must imply such a duty.
463 U.S. at 655 n.14, quoted in 2 BRENT A. OLSON, REGULATION OF SEcuRrTEs TRANSACTIONS AMONG
OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND SHAREHOLDERS §17:46 (2009); see also 4 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra

note 146, § 6:476.
The murky part of note 14 is this. Does the "special confidential relationship' connote
anything more than working for or with the corporation and receiving confidential
information for that purpose and with expectation (at least by the corporation) that the
information will be kept confidential? Analytically, no more should be necessary. "Special
confidential relationship" is probably only a legal conclusion describing the relationship, not
a phrase that must be used-or a concept that must be held-by the parties when they
create the relationship.
The company's expectation that information be kept confidential can be evidenced in
several ways. One is by marking the information "confidential" or otherwise so identifying
it. Another is by confidentiality agreements, ranging from informal oral understandings to
formal written documents (e.g., the kind often used in supplying information to proposed
acquisition partners and their advisers).
The Dirks Court's additional requirement-that the temporary insider's relationship to
the company must imply a duty to keep the information confidential-is puzzling. It seems
superfluous when there is an express agreement or warning to keep the information
confidential.
Id.
149. See 4 HAZEN, supra note 2,

§ 12. 17(5).
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whether the recipient of the information planned to trade on it to his or
her advantage. Such reckless disregard' could rise to the level of
scienter sufficient to sustain Rule iob-5 liability. This possibility alone
would seem sufficient reason to infer a nonuse agreement from the
presence of a confidentiality agreement.
The nondisclosure/nonuse distinction drawn in the Cuban decision
means that companies must take care when drafting confidentiality
agreements lest the agreement be construed as permitting trading on
nonpublic information provided pursuant to the agreement. A related
problem is the impact of a confidentiality agreement on Regulation Fair
Disclosure's ("Regulation FD") ban on selective disclosure of
information by publicly traded companies.' 5 ' Among other things,
Regulation FD permits the selective disclosure of material, nonpublic
information "to a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed
information in confidence."' 5 2 Regulation FD does not expressly require
a nonuse agreement prohibiting trading on the disclosed information.
Although not mentioning Regulation FD, the court's reasoning in Cuban
suggests that a confidentiality agreement to permit selective disclosure
under Regulation FD should include a prohibition on trading. With
respect to agreements drafted prior to the Cuban decision, it is to be
hoped that the courts would imply nonuse from a confidentiality
agreement. To do otherwise would seriously undermine the purpose of
Regulation FD, especially since that regulation was adopted amid
concerns about impermissible trading on nonpublic inside information.'"
The foregoing discussion points out that the court's opinion in SEC
v. Cuban took a much too narrow view of the misappropriation theory."

15o. Reckless conduct is sufficient to support a finding of scienter. Cf Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2oo7) (not deciding the issue but noting that -[e]very Court of
Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by
showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the Circuits differ on the degree
of recklessness required"). Scienter can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Cf id. at 328. ("A
plaintiff alleging fraud in a § io(b) action, we hold today, must plead facts rendering an inference of
scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.").
151. Regulation FD contains SEC rules addressing selective disclosure by issuers of material
nonpublic information. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103 (2oo9); see also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51715 (Aug. 24, 2ooo) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243); 4 HAZEN,
supra note 2, § 12.19(4).
152. 17 C.F.R. § 243.Ioo(b)(2)(ii).
153. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51715 (Aug. 24, 2ooo) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. 243).
154. Cf Macey, supra note 146, at 1922 ("The rules against insider trading are meant to protect

public companies and investors from theft of information that properly belongs to them. Insiders such
as executives or directors, and 'temporary insiders' such as attorneys, accountants, financial printers,
and investment bankers routinely obtain confidential information about a company in the course of
their work. The insider trading rules are intended to prevent both these permanent and temporary
insiders from abusing their positions of trust by trading in violation of their legal duties of
confidentiality.").
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The court acknowledged that a nonuse agreement could be implied."' In
the court's words, there must be "an express or implied
agreement-... not to disclose material, nonpublic information ... and not
to trade on or otherwise use the information."'56 It seems likely that a
complaint alleging this implication more specifically would have been
accepted by the court as sufficient. Since the information was supplied to
Mr. Cuban in furtherance of a corporate purpose, he should have been
when viewed in
considered a temporary insider'5 -especially
conjunction with the confidentiality agreement which should have been
interpreted to include a nonuse agreement.'58 It seems reasonable to
presume or infer nonuse from a confidentiality agreement in much the
same way that courts have presumed use of nonpublic information from

155. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2oo9).

156. Id. at 727.

The court next addresses whether the SEC has adequately alleged that Cuban entered
into an agreement sufficient to create the duty necessary to establish misappropriation
theory liability. State common law can impose such a duty, provided Cuban entered into an
express or implied agreement with Mamma.com not to disclose material, nonpublic
information about the PIPE offering and not to trade on or otherwise use the information.
The court concludes that the SEC's complaint is deficient in this critical respect.
Id.
157. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information -A

Breach in

Search of a Duty, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 83, 121 (1998) ("[T]he Court suggested that some outsiders
become temporary insiders because they have a relationship of trust and confidence with the source of
nonpublic information."); Macey supra note 142; see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider
Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26 CARDozo L. REV. 2023, 2057 (2005).

I have found that students have a hard time telling the difference between tippees on the
one hand and remote temporary insiders (and from misappropriators...) on the other.
Actually, they are easily distinguished if one keeps in mind that the former is a reversed
mirror-image of the latter. A remote temporary insider (like a misappropriator) is given
information in a relationship of confidence for the source's own purposes under
circumstances that prohibits [sic] the temporary insider from exploiting the information for
her own purposes or from further disclosing the information to others. In contrast, a tippee
is given non-public information with the expectation that the tippee shall trade on, or
otherwise use, the information for her own purposes. In other words, when a remote
temporary insider (or misappropriator) trades on the information, she is thwarting the will
and violating the property rights of the source of the information. But when the tippee
trades, she is fulfilling the intent of her tipper (albeit in violation of the tipper's duty to the
source).
Id.
158. See, e.g., David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique of the MisappropriationTheory of
Insider Trading, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 41, 57 (1998) ("[L]awyers, accountants, bankers, and others who

have a limited but special, confidential relationship with a corporation that gives them access to
information intended only for corporate purposes may be 'temporary insiders' who have a duty not to
trade in the corporation's securities until the confidential information has been disclosed."); Elliott J.
weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 1. CORP. L.
395, 396 ('998) (acknowledging temporary insider status as a basis for insider trading liability). But see
Seligman, supra note 145, at 1132 (1985) (questioning whether the Lund decision would have survived
Supreme Court scrutiny).

912

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:881

trading while in possession of the information.' Such a presumption is
consistent with the remedial purpose of section io(b) and Rule iob-5
that has been noted in other recent insider trading cases and by the
Supreme Court.'60 It remains to be seen whether other courts will accept
the unusually narrow reading of Rule Iob-5 in Cuban."'
As noted above, it is clear that a nonuse agreement even without a
traditional fiduciary duty can form the basis of Rule iob-5 liability.' The
fiduciary nature of a relationship, and an agreement that expressly or
impliedly requires nonuse of information, both support the
misappropriation theory in precluding someone from trading while in
possession of material nonpublic information.
In addition, the Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Dorozhko,
under which outsider trading liability can be based on a
misrepresentation rather than a per se expectation of confidentiality,
provides an alternative basis for upholding an insider trading claim in the
face of a confidentiality agreement.' For example, in the Cuban case,
Mr. Cuban's confidentiality agreement could be viewed as a
misrepresentation that induced the company to provide him with the
information about the upcoming offering that in turn enabled him to
trade on the information so provided.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION Is WARRANTED
Although reasonable people may differ on the foregoing
conclusions, they are amply justified under the current statute. Under
current law, the extension of insider trading prohibitions to outsiders
presents difficult and nuanced issues because of the need to link trading
prohibitions to a statute framed in terms of curbing deception. Much

I59. See, e.g., SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337-39 (ith Cir. 1998); United States v. Causey, No.
H-o4-o25-SS, 2005 WL 3560632, at *4--5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 25, 2009).
16o. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F-3d 42, 49-50 (2009) ("[W]e are mindful of the Supreme Court's
oft-repeated instruction that Section io(b) 'should be construed not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."') (quoting SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)));
see also, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 4o6 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 18o, 195 (1963).
161. The SEC has been able to secure consent orders even after the Cuban court's ruling. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Lyon, Litigation Release No. 21175, 2009 WL 2461154 (Aug. 12, 2oo9), available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21175.htm (consent order involving short selling in advance of
PIPE offering).
162. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Tex. 2009) ("The conclusion that an agreement
imposing duties of nondisclosure and non-use can support liability under the misappropriation theory
is supported by its consistency with the purpose of the theory.").
163. 574 F.3d 42, 49-51 (2d Cir. 2oo9). Among other things, the court in Dorozhko, id. at 49,
pointed to Basic Inc. v.Levinson as "distinguishing 'situations where insiders have traded in
abrogation of their duty to disclose or abstain,' from 'affirmative misrepresentations by those under no
duty to disclose (but under the ever-present duty not to mislead).'" (quoting 485 U.S. 224, 240 n. i8
(1988)).
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trading on nonpublic information can be fit within the deception
framework. However, this leads to the uneven results discussed above."'
The law of insider trading and outsider trading has been made
unnecessarily complex by the absence of a clear statutory definition of
when trading on material nonpublic information is a securities law
violation. Congress should resume the task it started and then
abandoned in 1984 of defining appropriate trading prohibitions.'6 5
Congress should consider reviving the rule followed by many courts,
prior to the Chiarella decision, that precluded trading on the basis of
nonpublic confidential information without tying the obligation to a
fraud-based rule. 66 This approach gained traction abroad'67 and deserves
attention here. A rule premised on unfair, unequal access to
information'6 8 is a more direct and thus preferable approach to the
machinations forced by the current statute.' The proposed rule focuses
on the problem of unequal access and resulting unfairness 70 that is in
reality the reason to prohibit trading on nonpublic information.'
Without a statutory clarification the courts are left to fashion the
common law of Rule iob-5 as best they can within the parameters of
section io(b). However, as hard as they may try, the limitations of the

164. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
165. See, e.g., O'Leary & O'Leary, supra note 40.

166. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
167. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading- Lessons From the European
Community Directive on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (1992) (discussing the

European Community's fashioning of trading prohibitions as compared to United States case law).
168. As the SEC explained in its seminal decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
[T]he obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving
access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing. In considering these elements under the broad language of
the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications.
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (196i) (footnote omitted).

169. As explained in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, "Rule [iob-5] is based in policy on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information." 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2nd Cir. 1968) (citing William
Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. Io9, ioo (1966)).

170. The Securities Exchange Act "purposed to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to
insure fairness in securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter,
or on exchanges." Id. (citing 3 Louis Loss, SECuRwIs REGULATION 1455-56 (2d ed. 1961)).
171. See, e.g., Strudler & Orts, supra note 9, at 4oo (insider trading prohibitions promote fairness
and equal access to information); Cox & Fogarty, supra note 9, at 372 (supporting insider trading
regulation as a matter of fairness and equal access to information); Strickler, supra note ii, at 523
("Outsider trading activity is detrimental to the integrity of the national securities markets.");
Langevoort, Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 5o-5r (urging a broad application of the
misappropriation theory and recognizing equal access to information as a valid goal of the securities
laws).
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current statute do not leave room for a coherent approach to insider and
outsider trading.
CONCLUSION

Despite its development in the courts for more than forty years, the
federal law of insider and outsider trading remains in an unacceptable
state of flux. This Article has examined recent developments in the law
of outsider trading. The recent cases have been overly restrictive in three
respects.
First, although the district court in Cuban got it right in part, the
court still put too heavy a burden on the government in cases seeking to
establish outsider trading prohibitions. The court was correct in rejecting
the defense's claim, supported by a number of law professors, that Rule
Job-5(c)'s disclose or abstain obligation for those in possession of
material nonpublic information is limited to breaches of fiduciary duty.
However, as pointed out above, the court erred in refusing to uphold the
SEC's complaint alleging that the trading was actionable as a breach of
the confidentiality agreement. The court's confidentiality/nonuse
distinction is spurious. Even accepting the distinction, the court should
have allowed the complaint to go forward on the ground that the nonuse
agreement could be inferred from a confidentiality agreement instead of
requiring an amended pleading to make that explicit.
Second, the Supreme Court in Chiarella taught us that although
knowing possession and use of nonpublic information is not sufficient to
violate Rule Lob-5, a violation can be premised on a breach of duty or
other wrongdoing. Contrary to the Second Circuit's ruling in Dorozhko,
there is a plausible argument that a theft is sufficient wrongdoing to
support a Rule Lob-5 violation. The Dorozhko court was correct,
however, in reversing the district court's denial of the SEC's request for a
preliminary injunction, reasoning that a claim could be made if the thief
obtained the information by means of a misrepresentation.
Third, the Chiarella decision signaled the possibility of a broad
reading of the type of wrongdoing sufficient to support a Rule Iob-5
trading violation. Rule iob5-2 is based on this interpretation. Contrary to
the implication of some of the cases,'72 SEC Rule Lob5-2 is well within the
reach of Rule iob-5 and the Court's lessons from Chiarella.
This Article makes a final recommendation. The need to link
outsider trading to the statutory deception requirement has made it
unnecessarily difficult to fashion a rational approach. Federal securities
172. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1273 n.23 (ith Cir. 2003) ("T]he SEC's new rule goes
farther than we do in finding a relationship of trust and confidence (e.g., the new rule creates a
presumption of a relationship of trust and confidentiality in the case of close family members). .. )
SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009); United States v. Kim. 184 F. Supp. 2d
ioo6, 1ol4-16 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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law is statutory in nature and is not well suited to the common law
development of insider and outsider trading rules. Congress should
return to the task it started and then abandoned in 1984 of defining
appropriate trading prohibitions such as those fashioned in the preChiarellacase law.
Congressional action is the preferred solution. Given the history in
this regard, there is a possibility that legislation is not in the offing. This
Article has pointed out that even in the absence of Congressional action,
the recent cases have taken too narrow a view of outsider trading under
existing law.
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